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From Enemy to Xenos: the evolution of a Schmittian category 
Introduction 
The concept of the Enemy is certainly one of the most distinctive within Schmitt’s 
theory, but to what extent does it represent nowadays a practical political category?  Given the 
dramatic differences that exist between Schmitt’s times and the present days, is the concept of 
the Enemy an effective tool to scrutinise the problem of the Other in contemporary societies  or 
does it create the risk of obscuring the analysis rather than illuminating it? In order to investigate 
this question, I will briefly describe the concept of the Enemy itself and compare it with cognate 
ones offered by Girard and Bauman, against the background of the nature of today’s society. On 
that basis I will make two intimations, one descriptive and the other normative: 1) the Enemy 
(along with its cognate concepts) does not adequately frame the political problem of the Other as 
it currently stands and we must find an effective alternative; 2) the only way to overcome the 
political problem that the Other currently represents is a more open approach towards the 
outsider, the basis of which can be found in Judith Butler’s political ethics.  
 
The Other in politics: From Schmitt to Bauman 
The figure of the Other has a rich intellectual history, especially in the area of philosophy, and 
this is no place to even attempt to delineate its complex genealogy. Suffice it to say that Hegel 
was the one that first comprehensively theorized the figure of the Other as an element necessary 
to develop subjective self-consciousness. In his Phenomenology of Spirit, he argued - and his 
argument has since had far reaching influence in areas as diverse as linguistics and psychoanalysis 
– that, in order to achieve a proper understanding of the self, one must undergo a process of 
intersubjective recognition. According to Hegel, we can reach self-consciouseness only when we 
see ourselves reflected into someone else’s gaze, as an external object posited in front of  another 
human being. Only then we realize that, as the other individual sees us as an external object,  she 
is too constituted by a subjectivity that was first foreclosed to us. In this way , we understand 
ourselves more fully both as a pure individual subjectivity and as an object in someone else’s 
gaze, leading us to a critical reflection on our actions and our place in the world. In the following 
pages I will explore the figure of the Other from a political perspective and to this extent I will 
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explore three authors which have greatly contributed to its elaboration: Carl Schmitt, René 
Girard , and Zygmunt Bauman.      
The idea that the Other is instrumental in establishing one’s self-consciousness was applied to the political 
context by Carl Schmitt. Schmitt famously suggested that the opposition between Friend and 
Enemy defines the political field.1 In his seminal work The Concept of the political, in fact, Schmitt 
identifies the source of the category of the political in the opposition between Friend and 
Enemy, the latter to be identified as a public enemy, a hostis, rather than a private enemy, i .e.  the 
inimicus. According to Schmitt, political categories emerge only when a concrete and existential 
antagonism between two social groups reaches a substantial level. Further, as Schmitt observes 
the political has no proper essence of its own as it “… can derive its energy from the most varied 
human endeavours, from the religious, economic, moral, and other antithesis”. 2 The political, 
understood in this sense, chiefly concerns the ultimate degree of intensity of a given opposit ion,  
the final outcome of a growing tension which subsumes and puts in the background lesser 
divergences within the social body. When a topic becomes conflictingly heated as to polarize a 
community into two distinct groups that perceive their counterparts as an enemy because of that 
very conflict – to the point that war is an ever-present possibility if not an outright necessity– 
then, Schmitt declares, we have the existence of a political dimension. The logical conclusions of 
such an argument is that any community, in order to have a structured social order together with 
its institutional framework embodied by the state,3 must identify its own enemy. Without such 
external target there would be, in fact, no society at all but rather an unruly multitude that would 
have no reason to hold together into a collective form. 
The idea of the Other as a negative reference to reaffirm the internal communal ties of a given 
society is also at the centre of René Girard’s philosophical antrophology and forms the basis of 
what he has described as the scapegoat mechanism.4 Girard famously suggests that human desire 
is always a mimetic desire, which is a desire that is borne out of imitation of someone else’s 
desire. Because of its nature, desire generates a sort of triangulation between the desiring subjects 
and the desired object which is characterized by a strong antagonism. When this antagonism 
reaches a level that threatens society’s stability, the way out of this dangerous situation is found 
in the scapegoating mechanism.5 A sacrificial victim is identified as the cause of the social tension 
                                                                 
1 G. Sartori, “The essence of the political in Carl Schmitt”, 1989, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1, 63. 
2 C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 38. 
3 Ibid., 30. 
4 On the deeper similarities between Schmitt’s and Girard’s thought see C. A. Fox, “Sacrificial pasts and 
messianic futures” (2007),  Philosophy and Social Criticism, 33, 563. 
5 R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred (London: Continuum impacts, 2005). 
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and is therefore sacrificed in order to restore society’s peace and serenity.  Girard, in particular, 
argues that the act of scapegoating is the foundational moment of civilization. Only through the 
violence exerted upon the scapegoat – an individual or a group that surreptitiously embodies the 
whole of society’s sins and whose sacrifice washes those sins away – a given community will be 
able to undergo a process of reconciliation that will pacify the now cleansed social body and 
reinvigorate its once corrupted identity. As Richard Kearney summarizes, according to Girard: 
 “Human societies are founded upon myths of sacrifice. These myths comprise a social imaginary 
which operates according to a mechanism of scapegoating generally concealed from human 
consciousness. It is this sacrificial mechanism which provides most communities with their sense 
of collective identity. But the price to be paid is the destruction of an innocent outsider: the 
immolation of the ‘other’ on the altar of the ‘same’.”6  
According to Zygmunt Bauman, both the Enemy and the Scapegoat are the protagonist of an 
“anthropoemic” mechanism, where the different one is “vomited”: incarcerated in camps or 
ghettoes, or rounded up; packed into a boat or into a plane and sent “where he came from”; or 
rejected at the borders. Bauman further suggests that modern societies have found another way 
of dealing with difference that, instead of rejecting the Other, try to assimilate her. Bauman 
describes this “anthropophagic” mechanism in the following terms: “The anthropophagic 
strategy consists of “devouring” and “digesting” the stranger, transforming thereby an alien 
substance body into a cell of one’s own organism. In short, in “assimilation”: renouncing 
whatever distinguishes you from the “genuine stuff”. If you want to be a French citizen you have 
to become a Frenchman in your behaviour, your language, the way you act, your ideas, 
preferences and values”.7 Such mechanism, Bauman argues, is typical of the liberal vision of the 
modern project and characterizes its dynamics of inclusion/exclusion:  
“People are different, implied the liberal project, but they are different because of the diversity of 
local, particularistic traditions in which they grew and matured. They are products of education, 
creatures of culture, and hence pliable and amenable to reshaping. With the progressive 
universalization of the human condition, which means nothing else but the uprooting of all 
parochiality together with the powers bent on preserving it, and consequently setting human 
                                                                 
6 Richard Kearney, “Myths and Scapegoats: The Case of René Girard” (1995), Theory, Culture & Society, 12 
(4), 1. 
7 I. Stiks, ‘The Past of Central Europe is the Future of Europe, an interview with Zygmunt Bauman”, Citizenship 
in Southeast Europe, updated on: 3 February 2012, at http://www.citsee.eu/interview/past -central-europe-future-
europe-interview-zygmunt-bauman (last visited 1 November 2013). 
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development free from the stultifying impact of the accident of birth -- that predetermined, 
stronger-than-human-choice diversity will fade away”.8  
 
 
The shift towards a liquid modernity: The emergence of the Xenos  
To what extent can the figures of the Enemy, the Scapegoat and the Stranger adequately 
represent the figure of the outsider, of the Other, in contemporary society? In order to answer 
this question we will first have to provide a general description of the nature of today’s society. 
Bauman himself has suggested that we are living in a “liquid modernity”, ie a historical phase 
where old rigid social structures and static points of reference have “melted” into an 
individualistic, highly relativistic, and loosely-connected social order.9 Bauman opposes “solid” 
and “liquid” societal forms. Drawing from physics, Bauman points out that “solid” forms are 
characterized by a static structure that is stable in time and in principle resistant to external 
forces whereas “fluid” forms are defined by an absence of fixed structure as they present an 
ever-changing configuration that adapts to the external conditions but, at the same time, are is 
able to penetrate into the smallest spaces. While solids tend to erase the variant of t ime and are 
defined by the space they occupy – their structure being the same at two different moments , 
liquids are almost exclusively identifiable by their temporal frame as the shape of the space they 
occupy changes constantly.10 Solid and liquid societal forms are therefore defined by opposing 
qualities: heavy versus light; condensed versus capillary; systemic versus network-like.11 
Solid and liquid forms are both modern, Bauman observes.  But while the first represented a 
recasting of old traditional structures (e.g. the estates, the corporations) into an improved,  more 
efficient, version of solidity, the latter mark a new stage in the process of modernization,  a  final 
dissolution of previous forms.12  Namely, the difference between solid and liquid modernity, 
                                                                 
8 Z. Bauman, Postmodernity and its Discontents (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997) 18. 
9 Z. Bauman, Liquid Modernity, (Cambridge, UK: Malden, MA: Polity Press; Blackwell, 2000). 
10 Bauman, 2000, 2. 
11 Bauman, 2000, 25. 
12 As Bauman argues the phrase “melting the solids” was present in the Communist Manifesto. But the first 
wave of modernity “melted” old solids only “…to clear the site for new and improved solids; to replace the 
inherited set of deficient and defective solids with another set, which was much improved and preferably 
perfect, and for that reason no longer alterable” (2001, 3). As icons of solid modernity Bauman cites the Fordist 
factory, bureaucracy, the Panopticon, the Big Brother and the Konzlager (ibid. 25-26).   
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rests in the collapse of the modern illusion of a telos in human progress and in the deregulation 
and privatization of the modernizing tasks and duties. 13  
This has led to an unprecedented process of individualization which Bauman does not see as 
straightforwardly liberating, but as a problematic strategic situation that leaves the subject open 
to a challenging and unsettling social complexity. Borrowing a phrase from Ulrich Beck, he 
suggests that “how one lives becomes a biographical solution to systemic contradictions”. 14 
Bauman’s argument is that the modern state has proclaimed and established a de jure (legal) 
autonomy of the individual which does not correspond to a de facto (factual) autonomy. This has 
led to a gradual corrosion of communal ethical bonds and hence to a melting of worldviews and 
an increasing normative incommunicability among subjects.15 As a consequence “a gap is 
growing between individuality as fate and individuality as the practical and realistic capacity for 
self-assertion. … Bridging this gap is, most crucially, not part of that capacity”.16 
Facing a rapidly changing social environment, the individual has at her disposal an almost 
infinite selection of living chances, but such freedom to be anybody (which anyways has to 
confront the practical possibilities one’s has to invent her own life) has its drawbacks:  
“the becoming bit suggests that nothing is over yet and everything lies ahead, the condition of 
‘being somebody’ which that becoming is meant to secure portends the umpire’s final, end -of 
game whistle: ‘you are no more free when the end has been reached; you are not yourself when 
you have become somebody’”.17 
Within this context it is possible to see that the whole question of identity – of what one is as a 
subject – becomes problematic. The individual is constantly called upon to redefine her self 
within a fluid society. This bears on the individual great opportunities, an unprecedented 
responsibility, but also a sort of irresolvable enigma. On the one hand, she is urged to be really 
herself, while, on the other hand, her self is pulled apart by multiple conflicting narrat ives. An 
individualized identity turns out to be a chimera that tries to stop the flow of liquid modernity, 
but at the same time must be flexible, adaptive, liquid,18 facing different practical conditions and 
                                                                 
13 Bauman, 2000, 29. 
14 Beck, Risk society: towards a new modernity (London: Sage, 1992), 137 as cited by Bauman, 2000, 34. 
15 In this regard Bauman (2000, 36), recalling De Tocqueville, argues that individualization is intrinsically at 
odds with a communal political project centred on citizenship.  
16 Bauman, 2000, 34.  
17 Bauman, 2000, 62. 
18 The problem of self-made identities – as opposed to externally imposed identities of solid modernity – is 
central in Bauman’s considerations about the “fate of individualization” of liquid times: “Consider, for instance, 
the contradiction of self-made identities which must be solid enough to be acknowledged as such and yet 
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situations. The substantive subjective commonality that represents the glue holding together 
society in the normalizing paradigm of solid societies is made unstable by the very conditions of 
liquid modernity as described by Bauman: 
“The task of self-identification has sharply disruptive side-effects. It becomes the focus of 
conflict and triggers mutually incompatible drives. Since the task shared by all has to be 
performed by each under sharply different conditions, it divides human situations and prompts 
cut-throat competition rather than unifying a human condition inclined to generate co-operation 
and solidarity”. 19 
Within such a liquid modernity therefore the question of identity explodes in a myriad of 
conflicting directions, challenging age-old assumptions regarding societal bonds. The first 
consequence of such a phenomenon is that there can be no single answer to the problem of the 
Other. As we can no longer hold pretend there is one unitary identitary category that defines our 
belonging to a given community, we, conversely, can no longer collapse the varied diversity of 
outsider within a single category. Such impossibility is certainly not a normative one (the injustice 
of gross generalization is always possible), but rather a functional one: if liquid society has melted 
old social norms and distinctions, how effective can it be to use closed category to identify 
something that is essentially individualized, whose essence will always seep through the barriers 
one could use to constrain it? 
To this extent, we must also recognize a particular shift in the nature of the Other, against the 
background of liquid societies: the Other cannot be blocked at the gates anymore, we cannot 
shield our communities from its arrival. Since the Other cannot be defined as a unitary category,  
the exemplars of her manifestation multiply to the extent that they can potentially be seen 
everywhere. If we focus long enough on someone, we will realize that anyone is sufficiently 
differential in and for herself as to rise the suspect that she is, in fact, an Other.  We are thus 
forced to accept its presence among our ranks, a presence that proliferates to the extent that it 
invests the whole of the social body and erodes to the point of non-existence the old core of 
“normality” that characterized solid societies.  
Thus the outsider is now a liminal figure that floats within our society, someone who is different 
and yet not readably recognizable as such. How then should this figure be described? What 
epithet should we use? I suggest the word Xenos (the Greek word for alien). The Xenos is alien 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
flexible enough not to bar freedom of future movements in the constantly changing, volatile circumstances” 
(Bauman, 2000, 50). 
19 Bauman, 2000, 90. 
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but yet among us, is someone with whom we must deal with but whose existence we want to 
hide from our gaze, a being that is dangerously similar to what Foucault describes as “the 
monster” in his 1974-75 Collège de France course: she lies between the impossible and the 
forbidden.20 On the one hand, she represents the impossible insofar as she is ultimately 
“unedible”, “undigestable”, her nature ontologically resisting complete assimilation.  On the other 
hand, she represents the forbidden individual, that, precisely because of her unsettling existentia l  
difference, we cannot accept or welcome. No longer is such an individual an Enemy, a Scapegoat 
or a Stranger, but rather she must be described as a Xenos, a perennial Other that we can never 
entirely know and trust, someone that, after all, is fundamentally alien and for whom we must 
create a system of modular control that would be able to identify and tame her as soon as she 
can represent a threat. 
Most importantly, the emergence of the Xenos necessarily produces a weighty consequence. As 
the Xenos is not recognizable a priori, but only when society has focused its attention upon her, 
when she has revealed herself as a potential threat to the ever-changing equilibrium reached by 
liquid society, it follows that we all are the Xenos. This is only logical. In a social landscape 
where unifying categories have melted, every single individual is different from all other 
individuals. The field of normality has withered away to the extent that it does not make sense  
anymore as a criterion of belonging, and the dimension of Otherness has engulfed us all.   
 
Four of a kind: The Other as a negative limit 
We have now a clearer map of the declensions of alterity in modern times. But what can 
this map tell us about the political nature of today’s societies? To answer this question, it  should 
be preliminarily noted that the Other usually functions as a sort of social mirror: the ways in 
which we conceive and treat the Other is often the most telling indicator of the directions in 
which our own community and future are developing. Exploring the way in which alterity is 
addressed in a given community and what kind of interpersonal relations it fosters is therefore 
fundamental to understand social dynamics and, in turn, the contours of structural political 
ideologies. 
                                                                 
20 M. Foucault, Abnormal : Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975 (London: Picador, 2003), 56. 
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Although Schmitt does not make explicit use of the concept of the Other in his formulation of 
the political, it seems clear that the dichotomy friend-enemy is heavily drawing from it. 
According to Schmitt, the difference that determines the existence of the Other vis-à-vis a given 
community is negatively charged from the political point of view as such Other is – exactly 
because of that difference (which is not an essentialist one but a floating socio-historically 
contextualized difference) – always understood as an enemy. In Schmitt’s vision, in other words,  
the Other is necessarily postulated in negative terms because what differentiates her from what 
the Friend – the constitutive element of her Otherness – is the generative cause of the inimical 
opposition that articulates the political. The Schmittian Enemy embodies an Other that cannot 
help us developing our own identity. In fact, it only works as a constitutive limit of an already 
given collective identity to which it is opposed. Nothing, through the confrontation with the 
Other, is positively drawn from the Friends’ community, which, on the  contrary, in order to 
maintain its unity and structure must reject the Other as a collective enemy. The existential 
nature of the enemy not only does not allow for any kind of reconciliation – bar the dissolution 
of the community itself – but also prevents a dialectical interaction between the two groups. 
Recognizing the Other as oneself is strictly excluded as a means to explore the meaning of one’s 
identity precisely because the meaning of identity resides in the gap between myself and the 
Other. Bridging that gap would thus signify the dissolution of one’s very existence. 21 
Girard’s scapegoat shares perhaps the most important trait of the Schmittian idea of the Other, 
namely that the difference separating the Other from a given community is always a negative 
one. What characterizes the Other, both in Schmitt’s and Girard’s vision, is a feature (or set of 
features) that, deemed axiological wrong , defines her identity by means of exclusion and, in turn, 
constitute the collective identity of the excluding community in a residual way, as the community 
that remains after the negative Other has been isolated and antagonised. The foundational 
element in this identity building mechanism is therefore represented by a lack: on the part of the 
Other, the lack of a given quality (a negative feature is necessarily structured as a lack); on the 
part of the excluding community, the lack is the absence in its ranks of a negative quality 
embodied in the Other.22 
The result of such pattern is that identities are (supposedly) always created with reference to a 
limit. They are not extensive in nature but rather founded by means of a rejection. Although 
                                                                 
21 Hirst thus described Schmitt as a conservative, chiefly concerned with defending a political framework in 
which the concrete order of society can be preserved. P. Hirst “Carl Schmitt”’s Decisionism” (1987), Telos, 
7215. 
22 R. Girard, The Scapegoat (London: Athlone, 1986) 21-22. 
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Schmitt’s Enemy and Girard’s Scapegoat are the protagonists of two opposite dynamics (the 
Enemy is the one that cannot enter into our midst while the Scapegoat is the one that must be 
sent away from our; the former is the stranger that cannot be welcomed otherwise will corrupt 
our identity while the latter is a fellow that turned out to be stranger to be ejected to salvage our 
identity; one is repelled while the other is thrown out; the former is readily recognizable while the 
latter is hidden in the folds of society) they are both subject to a firm rejection, a separation 
whose nature is unilateral and possibly violent (war in the case of Enemy, sacrifice in the case of 
Scapegoat). 
Bauman’s stranger seems, at first sight, to break with this negative vision of the outsider. The  
mechanism of assimilation that underlies such declination of the Other appears to contrast both 
Schmitt’s and Girard’s idea that the outsider is an extraneous and poisoning body within a  given 
community. The Stranger, on the contrary, is understood almost as a pilgrim to welcome, as a 
long lost member of the modern community that has finally found her way to the progress. Such 
scheme, however, does not regard the Other in a more positive light than the two other 
conceptions we have explored above. We should not forget, however, that Bauman himself, 
describing the Stranger is keen on recognizing that she is borne out of the liberal vision of 
modernity, of liberalism’s conviction that it could phagocitize the outsider and turn it into a 
docile, law-abiding citizen endorsing and putting into practice its values. Such faith is no more, 
or at least, not as sturdy as before.23  
The idea of the Stranger makes sense in relation to a clearly hierarchical order of cultures, where 
the host society is deemed superior to the one the outsider is coming from. As a consequence 
the Stranger’s contribution to the “welcoming” community can never be seen as a constructive 
one as she has to learn the ways of her hosts and imitate them, while it is implied that her hosts 
have nothing to learn from her.24 At a closer scrutiny, therefore, the ideal-type of the Stranger 
subscribe identitary dynamics which are not dissimilar from those associated with the “unedible 
stranger”: the relationship with the Other does not enrich one’s identity , it can only strengthen 
one’s identitary characteristics by emphasizing the different axiological value existing between 
two subjectivities. Identity, in this sense, is taken as something that can be understood 
                                                                 
23 D. Acosta and myself (Acosta & Martire, “Trapped in the lobby:  Europe’s revolving doors and the Other as 
Xenos”(2014), European Law Review, forthcoming), have suggested that the current EU regime of immigration 
–  which we characterized as regulated by a system of “revolving doors” that continuously threat immigrants 
with expulsion – is precisely a symptom of today’s troublesome relationship between advanced liberal 
democracies and the problem of outsiders.  
24 G. Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds) Marxism and the 
Interpretation of Culture (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988). 
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exclusively through an self-referential mechanism. If the Other represents the negative limit of 
our selfhood, then the only means to reflect on our identity is not confrontation with someone 
different from, but a form of internal dialogue that neglects the Other’s voice. 25 Anthropoemic 
and anthropophagic schemes, therefore, while seemingly expressing opposite logics, at a closer 
scrutiny rest on a similar idea: the Other is something that, in one way or another, must 
disappear. As Bauman himself points out:  
“Under the pressure of the modern order-building urge, the strangers lived, so to speak, 
in a state of suspended extinction. The strangers were, by definition, an anomaly to be 
rectified. Their presence was defined a priori as temporary, much as the current/fleeting 
stage in the prehistory of the order yet to come. A permanent coexistence with the 
stranger and the strange, and the pragmatics of living with strangers, did not need to be 
faced point-blank as a serious prospect”. 26 
The figure of the Xenos runs the risk of being just another stage into this sequence of negative 
alterity. In liquid societies the outsider is now a sort of entity that is inexorably part of the socia l  
body and yet cannot be completely assimilated by it. As a Xenos, her irreducible difference is at 
the same time difficult to pinpoint and feared; she is continuously scrutinized with the hope of 
perceiving the sign of an incipient threat keeping. To describe similar ambivalent situations Zizek 
has suggested that modern society experience a fascination of the real without being able to 
accept its most dangerous aspects:  a real without the real (coffee without caffeine, beer without 
alcohol, electric nicotine-free cigarettes, and so on).27 With particular reference to the way in 
which modern liberal societies relate to the Other, he has claimed that the Other can be included 
only on the condition that the fundamental difference that characterizes her is suppressed, and 
she is transformed into a “Decaffeinated Other”.28  
 
Dangers and opportunities 
                                                                 
25 B. Honig moves a similar criticism against the cosmopolitan approach to integration suggested by J. Kristeva 
in Strangers to Ourselves (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). B. Honig, Democracy and the 
Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) 55-58. 
26 Bauman, 1997, 18. 
27 S. Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates  (London: 
Verso, 2002). 
28 S. Zizek, “Liberal multiculturalism masks an old barbarism with a human face”, The Guardian, 3/10/2010 at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/oct/03/immigration-policy-roma-rightwing-europe (last visited 
1 November 2013). 
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The Xenos therefore represents the paradigm of the individual in the liquid modernity 
and signifies an alienation from one’s own political community, and from oneself. It marks a 
process of individualisation that is fundamentally at odds with the ideological discourse of 
liberalism that has developed roughly in the past three centuries. What might be the future 
consequences of such a shift? I would like to suggest two possible scenarios, one of which is 
quite troubling, while the other is rather more optimistic. Let me start from the ominous 
scenario which recasts Giorgio Agamben’s problem of the state of exception and that of the 
homo sacer in contemporary societies. Subsequently, I will turn to Judit Butler’s ethical theory for a  
more refreshing alternative. 
 
Towards ontopower? 
Agamben, in his analysis of the theory and practice of sovereignty,  starts from the consideration 
that “modern man is an animal whose politics questions its own life of living being”. 29 According 
to Agamben, the citizen of the modern state is understood as a bearer of rights from the 
moment of birth, establishing a complete equalization between the biological and political birth 
of the individual. The human being thus comes into the world at one and the same time as a 
living creature and a political subject, finding itself caught into a zone of indistinction where zoe  
(her biological life or what Agamben calls bare life30) and bios (her political life31) are strictly 
intertwined with one another. The biological substance of the individual is immediately and 
automatically charged with political meaning as she is subject without delay to the dominion of 
the sovereign decision.32  
In his investigations, Agamben finds an ancient parallel to bare life in an idea drawn from 
Roman times: homo sacer (sacred man). The homo sacer is a figure specific to the Roman world 
which identified some individuals that had committed very serious crimes. The homo sacer was 
characterized by a dual, and apparently oxymoronic, quality. On the one hand, he could not be 
sacrificed to gods and, on the other, he was without any legal protection, such that no act of 
violence exercised upon him would be sanctioned. Agamben states: “in the case of the homo sacer  
                                                                 
29 Agamben, Il regno e la gloria (Vicenza: Neri Pozza Editore, 2007); Stato di eccezione (Torino: Bollati 
Bordighieri, 2003); Homo sacer (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1995). 
30 Agamben. 1995, 3. References are made from the Italian edition.  
31 Agamben, 1995, 3. 
32 Agamben, 1995, 141. 
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a person is simply put outside human jurisdiction without being transferred under divine 
jurisdiction”.33  
Agamben therefore seeks to draw a parallel with the fundamental  structure of sovereignty. In 
particular, he focuses on the “state of exception” defined as the moment when sovereignty steps 
outside of law. He explains this state of exception as something akin to an exclusion. 
Characteristically, the relationship of exception excludes something from an order by claiming 
sovereignty over it. A sovereign relationship is thus set up by virtue of this exclusion. In 
Agamben’s words, the exception is “the extreme form of relation that includes something 
exclusively by means of its exclusion”.34 Given that sovereignty is a structure of inclusion, its 
foundational mechanism is that of exception. It is not to be confused with the attempt to control 
or neutralize a fundamental threat but, more importantly, to create and define “the very space 
where the juridico-poltical order can have validity”.35 Hence, if exception is fundamental to 
sovereignty, sovereignty itself is the “original structure where law refers to life and includes it 
within itself via its own suspension”.36 
Building up on Foucault’s remarks on the difference between the juridical and the biopolitical 
model of sovereignty, Agamben contends that modern biopolitics, supported by our expanding 
knowledge of human biological nature, invades spaces previously unknown and exerci ses its 
power discerning between what is to be considered worth living or open to death.  While 
classical sovereignty defined its political boundaries through the juridical declaration of the 
exception, the biopolitical sovereign constantly redefines life,  using it as the threshold that 
articulates and separates what is inside from what is outside the legal order. The concept of 
dignity of life is therefore transposed from the ethical to the political dimension. 37  
Moving from these considerations, Agamben identifies the concentration camps as the paradigm 
of our modern political landscape. Going back to the structure of the exception, Agamben 
argues that the concentration camp is “the space that opens up when the state of exception 
becomes the rule”.38 In the concentration camp the “quaestio facti [matter of fact] is no longer 
                                                                 
33 Agamben, 1995, 91. 
34 Agamben, 1995, 22. 
35 Agamben, 1995, 23.  
36 Agamben, 1995, 34. 
37 The case of euthanasia here becomes an emblematic example of the overlapping political and biological 
dimensions. In this regard Agamben (1995, 157) observes: “in modern biopolitics [euthanasia] is posited at the 
intersection between the sovereign decision on the life susceptible to be killed and the taking on of the care of 
the biological body of the nation, and marks the point where biopolitics necessarily turns into thanatopolitics”. 
38 Agamben, 1995, 188. 
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absolutely distinguishable from the quaestio iuris [matter of law]”.39 As its inhabitants have been 
stripped of any political statute and reduced completely to bare life, the camp is “the most 
absolute biopolitical space ever realized, where power faces before itself nothing more than pure 
life without any other mediation”.40 He concludes that “for this reason the camp is the very 
paradigm of the political space where politics becomes biopolitics and the homo sacer is virtually 
confused with the citizen”.41 Agamben thus suggests that today sovereign’s power hold on bare 
life has, in effect, transformed the whole of social space in a potential concentration camp where 
all laws can be suspended and the individual reduced to a bare body, bereft of the rights that 
attend citizenship. Since sovereign power has established a continuous dominion over life, the 
rule of exception can be enforceable on any subject at any time.  
Agamben’s considerations are certainly insightful but they seem to lack a certain clarifying force.  
As a matter of fact, Agamben’s description of sovereignty and biopolitics suggests that these are 
not to be understood as distinctively modern dynamics but as something almost intrinsic to 
human society and institutions.42 This, however, poses a problematic question: how useful or 
realistic is it to flatten the diverse historical manifestations of sovereignty into an a-historical 
(rectius trans-historical) conceptualization? It cannot be denied that Agamben’s vision of the state 
of exception and of the figure of the homo sacer are profoundly though-provoking, but it is 
difficult to shake off the impression that his characterizations appear somehow underdetermined  
and unable to accurately grasp the actual workings of power in our contemporary society. Of 
course, we have tragic examples of modern “camps” and homini sacri (Guantanamo comes 
immediately to mind, but that is but one actualization of the idea), but this leaves out a large 
number of cases in which the life of a person is individually and singularly entrapped by 
sovereign power. Surely, the metaphor of a “camp” can be used to picture a space where the 
person is stripped of her rights and reduced to her bare life, but how apt is it such a metaphor to 
describe to individualizing operations of modern power which selects and isolates with studied 
precisions single cases though its panoptical gaze?43  
                                                                 
39 Agamben, 1995, 190.  
40 Agamben, 1995,.191. 
41 Agamben, 1995, 191. 
42 This has prompted Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri – in Empire (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard 
University Press, 2000, 421, fn. 11) to suggest that Agamben embraces an anthropological idea of biopolitics. 
43 Keeping in mind Guantanamo, one cannot fail to recognize the great difference that runs between prisoners in 
the concentration camps of the Second World War and those detained in the American base: while the former 
were imprisoned indiscriminately because they belonged to a certain group which as a group threatened the 
existence of a given nation, the latter were “cherry-picked” through a surgical operation of intelligence, and 
locked away on the basis of specific risk factors.   
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Agamben, in the end, is unable to answer satisfactorily a haunting question: how is it possible 
that in the “age of rights” we are more than ever at risk of losing our rights? Was not the 
development of a human rights discourse precisely intended to safeguard us against the 
unacceptable intrusions of a brutal sovereign power? How to explain that the modern expression 
of the sovereign power is able to circumvent it so easily, so effortlessly, not differently from what 
happened in Nazi Germany with Jews or in the USA with Japanese-born and German-born 
citizens, through a generalized – but case specific – suspension of individual rights? The 
anthropological answer – that such unboundedness is definitional of sovereign power – appears 
as too superficial and calls for more satisfying explanations.  
These shortcomings seem to me to be caused by a rather underdetermined acceptance of the 
Schmittian concepts of state of exception and of the Enemy. Perhaps these concepts are 
analytically sound within the context of old nationalistic states, but they do not seem to reflect 
accurately the changes society has undergone since those days. The emergence of a liquid society 
where social categories have “melted” and cannot be taken as representative of any particular 
individual status, inherently challenges the plausibility of a unitary sovereign power which 
focuses on groups (the Enemy, in Schimtt’s thought, is in fact a collective noun for a political 
category) to palingenetically re-establish its own authority. The rise of the figure of the Xenos is 
the corollary of such shift and identifies the ever-looming possibility of being singled out, 
isolated, stripped to one’s bare life because of one’s specificity, the ever-present risk of becoming 
a homo sacer. Such danger is now greater than before thanks to the existential individualization 
brought about by liquid society which profoundly changes the ways in which sovereign power 
operates. National governments, administrative bodies, security agencies can nowadays easily 
zoom-in on a single person without a general suspension of individual rights as we are facing a 
whole different paradigm. The exception needs not to be imposed generally from above, 
solemnly proclaimed, broadly inclusive; rather it can operate silently and efficiently in the 
background, while the normality of the legal system keeps on running in a seemingly smooth 
fashion. The exception is, in this sense, no longer exceptional precisely because every individual  
is now an exception in herself, a single differentiated entity.   
Such new paradigm has been well descried by Brian Massumi in a provocative article.44 Massumi 
observes that we are moving towards a new form of neoconservatism which is establishing itself 
as a sort of Kunhian paradigm of contemporary politics. Taking cue from Foucault’s 
                                                                 
44 Massumi, “National Enterprise Emergency – Steps towards an ecology of powers”, Theory, Culture & Society 
2009 , 26(6): 153–185 
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consideration that modern regimes of power are “environmental” (in the sense that they act on 
the environment of social life in order to systematise its variables and achieve an optimal mastery 
of human resources within a given setting), Massumi intimates that the changing conditions of 
today’s society have transformed the ways in which power operates. Power, according to 
Massumi’s reading, surrounded by the possible occurrence of ever present threats does not l imit 
its operations to the counterbalancing of specific emerged dangers but attempts at defusing such 
dangers even before they are actualised and potentially out of control. In his own words:   
“When threat becomes ubiquitously generic, and the generic makes itself singularly felt, with 
effectively indeterminate formative force, toward an irruptive impulsion that is immanently 
conditioning, driving potentially pansystemic disruption and reordering, it becomes the bellwether 
… for the complex, crisis-incubating environment of life. Preemptive power directly follows”.45 
Within such context, the focus of power ceases to be on human life vis-à-vis its own 
environment in order to alter the very “life environment’s conditions of emergence”.46 In this 
sense power is no longer biopower but ontopower, a power that invests the whole plane of 
existence in order to “hijack” potential emergencies almost “countermimicking” a yet-to-occur 
accident.47  
The Agambenian scheme of sovereign power should, in this perspective, not so much rejected as 
slightly clarified. Given that social conditions have changed, so the workings of power have.  We 
no longer have a sovereign power that imposes the exception as a suspension of the normal 
course of affairs, but rather uses managerial approach to threat as a process that perpetually 
renovates its own system.48 Against this background we need to recognize the Schmittian idea of 
the Enemy can preserve its analytical strength only if interpreted as an abstract category which is 
                                                                 
45 Massumi, 2009, 167. 
46 Ibidem. 
47 Massumi, 2009, 168. 
48 Massumi (2009, 168-169) describes process and system in the following terms. “A ‘process’, in the 
terminology suggested here, is different from a system. It takes as its field of application  not the ground of a 
territory but the accidental groundlessness of the proto-territory. It does not settle into guarded and reproduced 
extensive distinctions. It starts in the striking simplicity of inclusive-disjunction, passing eventfully through 
system definition, only to overspill any and all acquired determinations ascribed to it, in the end complexly 
rejoining its inclusive-disjunctive conditions of emergence, with an added difference (consequent to actually 
having come to pass). … A process is fluctual. It is essentially unstable. A system, on the other hand, is an 
emergent, provisional stability arising at the cross -roads of processual tendencies whose formative force it 
siphons into its own self-organizing. A system feeds back on itself in order to settle things for itself: in order to 
settle a territory. Its mode of coherence is self-reproductive. Its operations feed back on themselves in the 
interests of their own conservation. What this means is that a system is self referencing. … A system is not the 
opposite of a process. System is a mode of expression of process. 
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always actualized in the concrete figure of the Xenos, a worrying warning of the dangers that our 
existential condition of fundamental alterity carries along. 
 
Towards a sympathetic politics? 
The mutable existential condition ushered in by the emergence of liquid society can, however, 
also represent an opportunity to open new ways in which humanity can still operate as a 
differentiated but cohesive community. One possible option, that would not rely on the calssica l  
ideal of universal categories (an ideal which is coextensive with solid types of societies, but which 
seems inherently at odds with the individualization of liquid societies), but would build on a 
renovated commitment towards Hegelian-inspired intesubjectivity is theorized by Judith Butler. 
Judith Butler, in her book Giving an account of oneself49 explores the possibility of ethical action. Her 
starting point is that identity is shaped by a varied array of external discourses which are imposed 
on us. Anyone who would try to give an account of her selfhood (note that account is different 
from description) would therefore find herself in a paradoxical situation. According to Butler’s 
view, the discourses through which we come to be formed do not just prevent us from being 
able to access a supposedly original core of selfhood through mechanisms of foreclosure, but 
ultimately testify to our impotence in articulating our identity – of giving an account of oneself – 
without reverting to a language that is essentially external to us. This awareness sheds an original 
light onto the question of recognition. As Butler observes: 
“If I understand myself to be conferring recognition on you … then I take seriously that the 
recognition comes from me. But the moment I realize that the terms by which I confer 
recognition are not mine alone, that I did not single-handedly devise or craft them, I am, as it 
were, dispossessed by the language that I offer. In a sense, I submit  to a norm of recognition 
when I offer recognition to you, which means that the ‘‘I’’ is not offering this recognition from its 
own private resources. Indeed, it seems that the ‘‘I’’ is subjected to the norm at the moment it 
makes such an offering,  so that the ‘‘I’’ becomes an instrument of that norm’s agency. Thus the 
‘‘I’’ seems invariably used by the norm to the degree that the ‘‘I’’ tries to use the norm. Though I 
thought I was having a relation to ‘‘you,’’ I find that I am caught up in a struggle with norms”.50  
As a consequence a sort of mirroring is established between oneself and the Other, to the extent 
that both experience the impossibility of being master of their own account. Most importantly, 
                                                                 
49 Butler, Giving an account of oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). 
50 Butler, 2005, 26. 
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one should recognize that one is in the same position of vulnerability as the subject to which 
recognition is given. As the latter’s existence as a subject is subordinated to a set of norms and 
rules that are imposed upon her by another subject, so the one giving recognition should see that 
her very existence has always been dependent on a discourse that is external to her, subject to a 
judgement that is, necessarily, violently imposed upon her. The opacity of the subject, the “blind 
side” of oneself is therefore the universal wound that is common to all individualities. Of course, 
as Butler further notes, the presence of this wound is a weakness that is difficult and painful to 
acknowledge as “we could wish ourselves to be wholly perspicacious beings”.51 But such dream 
would imply “to disavow infancy, dependency, relationality, primary impressionability; it would 
be the wish to eradicate  all the active and structuring traces of our psychological formations and 
to dwell in the pretense of being fully knowing, selfpossessed adults.”52  
Such desire would bring one close to something akin to a delusional state, where self-
referentiality would represent the horizon of thinking: “if self-assertion becomes the assertion of 
the self at the expense of any consideration of the world, of consequence, and, indeed, of others,  
then it feeds a ‘‘moral narcissism’’ whose pleasure resides in its ability to transcend the concrete 
world that conditions its actions and is affected by them.”53 To avoid this pathological situation – 
a situation that would negate the intimate essence of what it means to be human (i.e. to be 
constituted by an order that has been forcibly imposed upon us) – Butler concludes that “ethics 
requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments of unknowingness, when what forms us 
diverges from what lies before us, when our willingness to become undone in relation to others 
constitutes our chance of becoming human”.54 
Building on these suggestions, it appears that the understanding of the Other as a Xenos to be 
controlled, tamed and possibly stripped of her humanity, implies the risk of a kind of delusional 
“moral narcissism” that is akin to the solipsistic subjective self-referentiality that I have argued is  
associated with  negative conceptions of the Other. If we try to wall ourselves from the “injury” 
of the existence of the Other among ourselves, then we fail to recognize what it means to be 
someone - a subject that is always formed by the Other's interpellation, by a set of rules,  norms,  
conditions that are always necessarily outside of oneself. The repercussions of this failure are not 
just ethical but clearly also social and political.  
                                                                 
51 Butler, 2005, 102. 
52 Ibidem. 
53 Butler, 2005, 105. 
54 Butler, 2005, 136. 
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In the shift from a kind of society framed by solid, clear-cut social categories that imposed a 
largely homogeneous set of behavioural norms underpinning the process of individual 
subjectification, to one where such categories have melted giving rise to multiform paths of 
identity formation and ultimately to the fragmentation of the social body, the necessity of 
identifying a common element that would link us together (beyond the worn out myth of 
universalism) might find fertile ground in Butler’s ethical theory.  
To this end, we should abandon altogether – at least from a normative point of view – the idea 
of the Other as an external limit to one’s selfhood. Such idea, as I tried to show, directly 
descends from the Schmittian concept of the Enemy, whose current declension – within the 
changing contours of liquid society – is the Xenos. In order to do this, understanding the 
passage from the figure of the Enemy to that of the Xenos becomes of paramount importance. 
The danger of not reassessing the figure of the Enemy against the modern dynamics of power 
and society is that we would not be able to conceive alternative political model and would fall 
back in old conflictual schemes.  
A clear example of such theoretical problem is expressed by Slavoj Žižek’s appreciation of 
Schmitt’s concept of the Enemy as key to understanding the deadlock of today’s liberalism. 55 
Žižek claims that Schmitt’s theory can be described as a theory of ultra-politics where a disavowal 
of politics proper takes place: political conflict is depoliticized by bringing it to the extreme, via 
the direct militarization of politics. As Žižek puts it: “In ultra-politics, the repressed political 
returns in the guise of the attempt to resolve the deadlock of political conflict by its false 
radicalisation – by reformulating it as a war between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, our enemy, where there is 
no common ground for symbolic conflict”.56 Schmitt’s ideas are thus useful, according to Žižek ,  
to the extent that they show us liberalism’s “trick”, which is to have foreclosed the conflictual 
dimension of the political and endorsed a post-political, technocratic, ideology.57 Žižek’s intimation 
is to return to the proper political dimension by embracing an agonistic politics58 that would 
couple universalism with the “militant, divisive position of one engaged in a struggle”.59 But is not 
this kind of reasoning fundamentally at odds with the liquid status of our modern society? Is not 
                                                                 
55 Žižek, “Carl Schmitt and the paradox of liberal democracy”, in C. Mouffe The challenge of Carl Schmitt 
(London: Verso, 1999). 
56 Žižek, 1999, 29 
57 Žižek, 1999, 35. 
58 Mouffe & Laclau, Hegemony and socialist strategy : towards a radical democratic politics  (London : Verso, 
1985). 
59 Žižek, 1999, 35, emphasis in the original. 
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the assumption that we can still have a sort of abstract universalism deeply irreconcilable with 
the nature of today’s conditions of existence?  
Faced with this dilemma, should we not attempt at least to reframe the ideal of agonistic polit ics 
in a way which, while acknowledging difference, does not see in it as an hurdle to overcome or 
circumvent but as an opportunity to question and overcome the process of our subjectification? 
Butler’s ethics might be a first step in such a direction, towards what we could call a sympathetic 
politics, a politics of shared feelings (the word sympathetic comes from the ancient Greek 
συμπάϑεια, from σύν – “with”, “together” – and πάϑος – "feeling") . Seeing the Other not 
anymore as an Enemy but as a fellow Xenos – like us fundamentally wounded because 
constituted by norms that were imposed upon her, ultimately dispossessed of her own 
subjectivity, alienated by her own life – we could be able to finally approach that obscure object 
at the core of our identity: one’s alterity to oneself. This would allow us a universal – but not at 
all universalistic60 – commonality upon which to build a new, more fruitful, relationship with the 
Other. Of course such ethical commitment cannot solve the conundrums that the shift towards 
a liquid model of society has generated. But seeing the Other as a someone that suffers likes us 
from the impotency of articulating her very self it could represent the basis for a new kind of 
democratic discourse that would not repress or foreclose politics’ agonistic tendencies, but rather 
embrace a more sympathetic model that could help us to grow together and not further apart.   
 
                                                                 
60 Anna Karenina’s incipit, by Leo Tolstoy, comes to mind as a description of this shared solitude: “Happy 
families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”.  
